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CO-PARTIES: USE OF ADMISSIONS AND
DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
Admissions and declarations against interest, which are
commonly recognized and treated as exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule,' are often confused with one another. While Illinois courts
and attorneys have from time to time shared in this confusion,2
Illinois does recognize the careful distinctions between the two.

Because the permissible use of a statement sought to be admitted against a party or co-party as either an admission or a
declaration against interest will be determined by the characterization of the statement, it is important to distinguish precisely
between the two. Indeed, exclusion of evidence that should have
properly been admitted or evidence, properly admitted, but mistakenly held binding on a co-party are but two consequences of
a failure to distinguish between the two concepts. 3 As a practical
matter, when an admission is sought to be entered into evidence
it will be against some interest of the party who made it or it
would not and could not be offered. To keep this term from
being confused with the term, "declaration against interest," an
exception requiring the statement be against the maker's pe1Wigmore does not treat an admission as an exception to the Hearsay
Rule.
The theory of the Hearsay rule is that an extra-judicial assertion is
excluded unless there has been sufficient opportunity to test the grounds
of assertion and the credit of the witness, by cross-examination by the
p arty against whom it is offered. . . . Hence the objection of the
earsay rule falls away, because the very basis of the rule is lacking,
viz. the need and prudence of affording an opportunity of cross-examination.
(How can a party complain that he did not get an opportunity to crossexamine himself?) 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1048 (3rd ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. For further discussion as to whether an admission is technically an exception to the Hearsay Rule, see text at note 47
infra.
2See Frazier v. Burks, 95 Ill. App. 2d 51, 238 N.E.2d 78 (1968). See
also Kaye, Department of Popular Misapprehensions; Admissions Distinguished From DeclarationsAgainst Interest, TRIAL BRIEFS 880 (Mar., 1965) ;
Department of Popular Misapprehensions Revisited, TRIAL BRIEFS 1065
(July-Aug., 1968).
3 Perhaps one fact tending to perpetuate this confusion is the unfortunate practice of calling an "admission" an "admission against interest."
As will be shown, admission of evidence as an admission does not require
the finding that it was "against interest," at least in the sense in which that
phrase is used in connection with a declaration against interest. As a practical matter:
[A]nything said by the party-opponent may be used against him as an
admission, provided it exhibits the quality of inconsistency with the
facts now asserted by him in pleadings or in testimony. (This proviso
never needs to be enforced, because no party offers thus his opponent's
statement unless it does appear to be inconsistent.)
4 WIGMORE §1048. Further, were a party to offer, on his own behalf, a
statement which was not against his interest it could not be received since
it would be self-serving.

1970]

Admissions and DeclarationsAgainst Interest

365

cuniary or proprietary interest at the time it is made, it should
be referred to simply as an admission. Since each of the above
exceptions are separate and distinct and the prerequisites to

admissibility different, erroneous usage of the terminology may
result in misapplication of the prerequisites and hence a wrongful
application of the rules governing each. 4 Therefore, to avoid
confusion, and to be technically correct, admissions should be
referred to as such and not as "admissions against interest."
An excellent example of how important it is to distinguish

between admissions and declarations against interest and the
prerequisites necessary to each is the Illinois case of Frazier v.

Burks.5 In that case a co-party defendant argued that a statement introduced into evidence was an admission of a party while
the plaintiff argued that it was a declaration against interest.6
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, in Frazier held

that a statement made by a co-party defendant, who was unavailable at the time of trial, was admissible against the other
co-party defendant as a declaration against interest. 7 A correct
4
Nevertheless, because most statements used as admissions do
happen to -state facts against interest, judges have been found who were
misled by this casual feature and treated admissions in general as obnoxious to the Hearsay rule, and therefore as entering only under an
exception to that rule.
4 WIGMORE §1049. Wigmore is, in effect, saying that judges have applied
the tests for a declaration against interest to a statement that was an admission and need not meet those tests.
5 95 Ill. App. 2d 51, 238 N.E.2d 78 (1968).
6 The facts of the Frazier case were: Plaintiff automobile guest passenger sued two alleged tortfeasors, defendant co-party dram shop (tavern)
owner and co-party automobile driver. Plaintiff claimed personal injuries
from the negligence of co-party defendant driver whose automobile crossed
the median strip and struck headon the auto in which the plaintiff was riding. Several days after the accident the driver gave a written, signed
statement as follows:

On Saturday, June 3, 1961, about 1:00 p.m. I left my apartment
and drove my 1959 Buick Sedan over to Mosley's Lounge located at 4425
South Wells Street. I was alone and after I walked into the tavern
I met Isiah Banks, Walter Banks and a fellow named Wolf. We sat
down in the first booth from the front door and we ordered a couple
of half pints of Ballentine Scotch. We sat there drinking and talking
for awhile. A little after 7 p.m. I figured I had plenty to drink and
decided to get home. I managed to get into my car and my head was
spinning. I vague[ly] remember driving south on Wentworth Avenue,
and suddenly there was a car ahead of me. The next thing I remembered was loud crashing noises. Later a policeman told me that I had
hit two cars. He asked me if I had been drinking liquor and I told him
that I had and where I drank it at.
Id. at 53, 238 N.E.2d at 80. The co-party driver could not be located for trial
but his statement was introduced. The trial court refused to admit the
statement saying it was an admission of a party and while it could be used
against the driver it could not be used against the co-party tavern owner
because there was no joint interest between the driver and the tavern
owner (i.e. no privity, no principal-agent relationship, no master-servant
relationship).
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, reversed and remanded.
It found that the signed statement was a declaration against interest and
was, as such, admissible against the co-party defendant tavern owner.
The Court found that the statement met the four requirements: (1) de-
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understanding of the similarities, differences and respective uses
of admissions and declarations against interest necessarily requires a thorough analysis of both. Such analysis must start
with the nature and historical development of the Hearsay Rule
and its exceptions.
HISTORY OF THE HEARSAY RULE

The genesis of the rule against the admission of hearsay
evidence was a reflection of the change in the nature and function
of the jury between 1400 and 1696. The jury of the early 1400's
consisted of so-called informed persons who were not actually
clarant unavailable, (2) declaration against pecuniary interest, (3) knowledge, and (4) no motive to falsify. Depending upon the use to which the
declaration is put it may or may not meet requirements two and four. When
scrutinized closely the declaration may not pass the tests.
See text at notes 73-75 infr'a.
It should be further pointed out that the declaration against interest
must be analyzed in light of the fact that the Frazier case is a dramshop
action brought under the Illinois Liquor Control Act commonly referred to
as the Dram Shop Act. The section under which it was brought reads as
follows:
§135. Actions for damages caused in intoxication - Lessor's liability
-

Forfeiture of lease -

Maximum recovery -

Limitations.

§14.

Every person, who shall be injured, in person or property by any intoxicated person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name,
severally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling
or giving alcoholic liquor, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in
part, of such person; and any person owning, renting, leasing or permitting the occupation of any building or premises, and having knowledge that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein, or who having leased
the same for other purposes, shall knowingly permit therein the sale of
any alcoholic liquors that have caused, in whole or in part the intoxication of any -person, shall be liable, severally or jointly with the person
or persons selling or giving liquors aforesaid, provided, that if such
building or premises belong to a minor or other person under guardianship or conservatorship the guardian or conservator of such person, shall
be held liable instead of such ward; and a married woman shall have the
same right to bring suit and to control the same and the amount recovered as a feme sole; and all damages recovered by a minor under this
Act shall be paid either to such minor, or to his or her parent, guardian
or next friend as the court shall direct; and the unlawful sale or giving
away, of alcoholic liquor, shall work a forfeiture of all rights oi the lessee
or tenant, under any lease or contract of rent upon the premises where
such unlawful sale or giving away shall take place; and all suits for
damages under this Act may be by any appropriate action in any of the
courts of this State having competent jurisdiction. An action shall lie
for injuries to means of support, caused by an intoxicated person, or in
consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person,
resulting as aforesaid. Such action shall be brought by and in the name
of the person injured, or the personal representative of the deceased person, as the case may be, from whom said support was furnished, and the
amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of
the person or persons injured in loss of support, and shall be distributed
to such persons in the proportions determined by the judgment or verdict
rendered in said action. If such right of action is settled by agreement
with the personal representative of a deceased person from whom support was furnished, the court having jurisdiction of the estate of such
deceased person shall distribute the amount of the settlement to the person or persons injured in loss of support in the proportion as determined by the Court, that the percentage of dependency of each such
person upon the deceased person bears to the sum of the percentage of
dependency of all such persons upon the deceased person....
Iii. REv. STAT. ch. 43, §135 (1959).
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called to give testimony on the witness stand in open court. Witness' testimony was obtained, for the most part, by the jury
consulting with persons outside of court. That is, witnesses did
not testify in court but had spoken with or been consulted by
one or more jurors outside of the courtroom.
The jury, in the 1400's, did not sit in court and await testimony to be presented to it. The jury investigated for itself
and based its verdict upon either personal knowledge (i.e., a
juror heard or saw the transaction or matter in dispute) or
through what is commonly referred to as hearsay (i.e., a juror
listened to opinions of his father or such other persons as he
thought were trustworthy). Not all testimony was gathered by
the jurors in this fashion. There were certain deed witnesses
and transaction witnesses who gave testimony in open court.
These latter examples, however, were the exception rather than
the rule. Hence, it can be said that generally, during the fifteenth century, juries were, due to the relatively small size of
communities, drawn from persons who had either seen or heard
of the incident now at trial or who were close enough to the incident or matter and parties to investigate and determine the
facts and circumstances of it.
It appears that during the sixteenth century, consonant with
the decentralization of trials as communities both spread and
enlarged, a change in the jurors' function occurred, so that
jurors depended upon the testimony of witnesses in court whom
they might never before have seen or met. Thus, in contrast
to the fifteenth century, where testimony (e.g., as the deed witness and the transaction witness) had been relied upon very
little, testimonial statements became the basis of the jurors' verdict in the sixteenth century. Personal knowledge and personal
investigation of the facts by the jurors began to fall into disuse.
This development followed naturally and logically as communities
expanded and became less homogeneous.
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries
the role of the witness and the role of the jury as known today
came into being. The jury began to depend exclusively upon the
testimony of witnesses for facts upon which to base a verdict.
In the seventeenth century especially, since jurors based their
verdicts upon the testimony of strangers, it became natural to
question the sufficiency of witness' testimony both as to quantity
and quality. Jurors had no personal knowledge of the facts
and relied completely upon testimony presented in court. What
was presented to the jurors determined the outcome of the suit.
There had hitherto been no prejudice against the jury's utilizing
information from persons not produced. But now that their verdict
depended so much on what was laid before them at the trial, and
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now that the sufficiency of this evidence, in quantity and quality,
began to be canvassed, it came to be asked whether a hearsay thus
laid before them would suffice. It was asked, for example, whether,
if there was one witness testifying in court from personal knowledge and another's hearsay statement offered, the two together
would suffice.8

Though this question of sufficiency arose in the late sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries with regard to hearsay evidence, Wigmore
maintains that it was clear that hearsay was admissible in the
sixteenth century. In the early seventeenth century hearsay was
admissible also, but it was often objected to, sometimes found to
be of little or no value by judges, and occasionally even excluded.9
It seems that somewhere between 1675 and 1690 the exclusionary rule against accepting hearsay became fixed. At
first, the rule excluded hearsay only when offered by itself. Hearsay was still accepted if it merely supplemented or corroborated
evidence already admitted. The Hearsay Rule at this date did
not exclude extrajudicial sworn statements. It applied only to
unsworn statements. So, in effect, hearsay in the form of a
sworn statement was admissible. The reason for this appeared
to be the manner of giving testimony at trial at that time. The
sworn statement of a witness was read aloud to the jury and then
the witness took the stand and swore he made the statement
and made it voluntarily. By 1696, however, the Hearsay Rule
excluded even sworn statements and became the Hearsay Rule
as it is known today. The rule excluded testimony not subject
to the right of cross-examination. 1°
THE HEARSAY RULE AND ITS BASIS

The Illinois Supreme Court has defined hearsay as "testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made out of
court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show the
truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value
upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."' 11 More concisely, hearsay is evidence which, "consists in the testimonial use
of an unsworn, 12 out-of-court statement as proof of the fact asserted by the out-of-court declarant. ' ' *3 In People v. Carpenter
8 5 WIGMORE

§1364.

9Id.
10 For discussion of the history of the Hearsay Rule, see 5 WIGMORE
§1364; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Introductory Note, ch. VI (1942); Morgan,
The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 247
(1936-37); 1 F. BUSCH, LAW & TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS 11-14 (1959).
11 People v. Carpenter, 28 Ill. 2d 116, 121, 190 N.E.2d 738, 741 (1963).
12 This comment will show that it does not matter whether a statement
is sworn or unsworn for purposes of determining whether or not it is hearsay.
18 Gass v. Carducci 37 Ill. App. 2d 181, 187, 185 N.E. 2d 285, 288-89
(1962). See also Novici v. Department of Fin., 373 Ill. 342, 26 N.E.2d 130

(1940); Adamaitis v. Hesser, 56 Ill. App. 2d 349, 206 N.E.2d 311 (1965);
Northern Trust Co. v. Moscatelli, 54 Ill. App. 2d 316, 203 N.E.2d 447
(1964); People v. DeMarco, 44 Ill. App. 2d 459, 195 N.E.2d 213 (1963).
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the court quoted the example of hearsay cited by Wigmore where
A testifies that, "B told me that event X occurred.""14 If the
testimony of A is offered merely to prove that B made the statement, it is not hearsay and is admissible. If, however, the testimony of A is offered to prove that event X occurred, it is hearsay and inadmissible as such.
The Hearsay rule points out that B's assertion, offered testimonially, [by A as a conduit] is not mad2 on the stand and presently,
but out of court anteriorly, and challenges it upon that ground.
The Hearsay rule tells us that B's assertion (even assuming B to
have been qualified, by knowledge and otherwise, as a witness)
cannot be accepted because it has not been made at a time and place
where it could be subjected to certain essential tests or investigations calculated to demonstrate its real value by exposing such
latent sources of error.',
Various reasons have been put forth to explain why hearsay
testimony is objectionable: (1) lack of oath, (2) lack of confrontation, and (3) lack of opportunity to cross-examine.- William
Reynolds gives a concise and competent explanation of these
reasons as he explains:
The reasons for the rule excluding hearsay, or, as Mr. Best more
accurately terms it, "derivative evidence," are not difficult to discover, for apart from circumstance that the probabilities of
falsehood and misrepresentation, either wilful or unintentional,
being introduced into a statement are greatly multiplied every time
it is repeated, there remains the further fact that the original
statement, even if correctly reported, has scarcely ever been made
under the safeguards of the personal responsibility of the author
as to its truth, or the tests of a cross-examination as to its accuracy. It is indeed true, that, in the ordinary affairs of life,
men often act upon information received at second hand, but this
is seldom done in matters of much importance, unless either they
or their informants possess sufficient personal knowledge of the
party from whom the statement originated to form an intelligent
estimate of his general disposition to speak the truth, the temptation he may be under to deceive, and his probable means of accurate
information in regard to the subject matter of his statement. 7
The Illinois Supreme Court recognized these objections in 1he
14People v. Carpenter, 28 Ill. 2d 116, 121, 190 N.E.2d 738, 741 (1963).
See also 5 WIGMORE §1361.
I' 5 WIGMORE §1361.
16 There are five "traditional reasons" offered to justify the exclusion
of hearsay: (1) declarant not under oath, (2) witness may have a faulty
recollection, (3) lack of confrontation, (4) fraud could be facilitated, and

(5) no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (though upon his credibility rests the trustworthiness of the statement). See Comment, A Sym-

posium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence and Illinois Evidence Law, 49
Nw. U.L. REv. 481 (1954-55). James brings out another possible reason
when he says: "Similarly, one cannot but wonder, no cause being stated,
whether a litigant who prefers quoting a material witness to calling him
does not do so out of desire to avoid full disclosure." James, The Role of
Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REV. 788, 797 (193940). Wigmore discusses other so-called "spurious" reasons for the Hearsay

Rule at 5

WIGMORE §1363.
17W. REYNOLDS, LAW OF EVIDENCE, 18-19 (2d ed. 1890).
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Carpenter case when it asserted that the real reason for ob-

jection to hearsay was the fact that the witness' testimony or
statement would be admitted into evidence without the opponent
having an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The court
in Carpentersaid:
The fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule was and is to test the
real value of testimony by exposing the source of the assertion to
cross-examination by the party against whom it is offered. While
the administration of an oath and the right of confrontation are
also spoken of as necessary elements, the essential feature, without
which testimonial offerings must be rejected, is the opportunity
for cross-examination of the party whose assertions are offered to
prove the truth of the act asserted.18

The rule against hearsay is a basic and fundamental rule of
evidence today.1 9 It is generally accepted today that the primary
objection to hearsay, as was stated in Carpenter,is the lack of
opportunity to cross-examine. 2 ° Jendresak v. Metropolitan Life

Insurance Co. 21 exemplifies the Illinois view that hearsay is excluded for lack of cross-examination. This case also indicates
1828 Ill. 2d 116, 121, 190 N.E.2d 738, 741 (1963).
The court was
quoting Wigmore.
19 Fantozzi v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 35 Ill. App. 2d 248, 257,
182 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1962). However, hearsay can be competent if it is not
objected to when introduced. See Arkansas Sweet Potato Growers' Exch.
v. Wignall-Moore Co., 249 Ill. App. 34 (1928).
This point is further illustrated in a case which gives an excellent
example of classic hearsay. In Hoover v. Empire Coal Co., 149 Ill. App. 258,
262-63 (1909), the court said:
The only testimony having any tendency to show how deceased
received his injuries was the evidence of a physician who attended
deceased after he had been removed to his brother's home and who
testified that his brother asked deceased how he got hurt, and that
deceased said that the mule backed up and that he went down. No objection was interposed to this testimony and it therefore is to be treated
as competent, but that conversation was not a part of the res gestae,
and we fail to see how proof that deceased made that statement is any
proof that that was the manner in which deceased came to go under the
car. It is proof that he made the statement, but not proof of the fact.
(emphasis added.)
20 "The theory of the Hearsay rule... is that the many possible sources
of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may lie underneath the bare
untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to light and exposed,
if they exist, by the test of cross-examination." 5 WIGMORE §1420. That
lack of cross-examination could allow error is illustrated by the Hall case
wherein the court said:
The court instructs the jury, that they must reject all hearsay evidence of the number of hogs delivered by Hall at Chicago. That it was
Hall's duty to count them himself or have them counted by some person
at Chicago and if they were counted by any other person than Hall,
then the evidence of the man who counted the hogs should have been
given to the jury.
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Hall, 58 Ill. 409, 410 (1871). See also Village of Morton
Grove v. Gelchsheimer, 16 Ill. 2d 453, 158 N.E.2d 70 (1959); Schattgen v.
Holnback, 149 Ill. 646, 36 N.E. 969 (1894) ; Corey v. McDaniel, 42 Ill. 512
(1867); Chapman v. Gulf, M.&O. R.R., 337 Ill. App. 611, 86 N.E.2d 552
(1949); Illinois Steel Co. v. Ferguson, 129 Ill. App. 396 (1906); Caruthers
v. Balsley, 89 Ill. App. 559 (1899) ; Pittard v. Foster, 12 Ill. App, 132 (1882).
21330 Ill. App. 157, 70 N.E.2d 863 (1946).
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that the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule are based upon necessity
and built-in trustworthiness.22
REASONS FOR EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE

The Hearsay Rule excludes all extra-j udicial statements that

are offered to prove the truth of the matter that is therein asserted. The reason, as indicated above, is because there is no
oath and no opportunity to cross-examine. This is understanda-

ble when it is seen that the witness is not himself testifying but
is serving as a conduit for a declarant not in court and not subject
to cross-examination. If the witness in court is testifying to
what another declarant said, "[t]here is considerable danger
that he may have heard inaccurately or have a faulty recollection, and there is always the risk that he may, where the
declarant is dead, insane, or otherwise unavailable, be tempted
to falsify. '' 2 3 The oath and cross-examination will guarantee
that the witness is truthfully and accurately portraying what he
heard. Hence, these factors serve as sufficient safeguards for
proof that the statement (by the declarant) was made. However, they fail to provide sufficient safeguards as to the accuracy
and truthfulness of the declaration made by the declarant and
now testified to by the witness.
Now when the declaration is offered for its truth, the witness is
testifying only as to its fact and content, and the declarant is really
testifying to the matter asserted in the declaration. Consequently,
since the declarant is not under oath and not subject to crossexamination, his declaration
is deemed prima facie too untrust24
worthy to be received.
22 In Jendresak the plaintiff sought to recover on a life insurance policy
where the insured had disappeared and was presumed by the plaintiff to be
dead.
The defendant insurance company contended that the plaintiff's
daughter had seen the insured alive several years after he disappeared. The
defendant sought to introduce letters from the daughter supporting his contention. The court said:
The admission of the hearsay evidence contained in these letters on
Grady's hearsay testimony would have deprived plaintiff of her right
to cross-examine Stella and Helen as to whether they had written the
letters and as to the truth of the facts set forth therein and it might well
have developed, if they were subjected to cross-examination, that neither
of them had written the letters or seen their father in 1931 or at any
other time since he disappeared. That this is true is clearly indicated
by the conflicting statements contained in the letters.
Id. at 170, 70 N.E.2d at 869.
The court in Jendresak further stated:
Every exception to the hearsay rule with which we are familiar is
predicated upon necessity and public policy and the reason for such
exceptions is that hearsay evidence is the best evidence obtainable and
that material facts would not otherwise be capable of proof. Where
material facts are susceptible of proof by persons who are alive and are
claimed to have personal knowledge thereof, it is never permissible to
resort to hearsay evidence to prove such facts.
Id. at 171, 70 N.E.2d at 870.
23 E. MORGAN, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITs REFORM
37 (1927).
24 Id.
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Cross-examination serves not only to test the truthfulness
of the witness but also to test his qualities of "perception, memory, narration."2 5 Since "[ijt is only by the use of cross-exami'2 '
nation that the various defects of testimony can be exposed,
lack of such cross-examination or lack of opportunity for such
cross-examination is given as the basic reason for not admitting
hearsay. Whether the lack of oath is also a reason is questioned by legal scholars. McCormick seems to feel that the oath
impresses the witness with the danger of punishment for lying,
and hence its value, while Wigmore seems to feel it is incidental.27
Wigmore 28 disposes of the right of confrontation as being
one of the reasons advanced for excluding hearsay:
Now Confrontation is, in its main aspect, merely another term
for the test of Cross-examination. It is the preliminary step to
securing the opportunity of cross-examination; and, so far as it is
essential, this is only because cross-examination is essential. The
right of confrontation is the right to the opportunity of crossexamination. Confrontation also involves a subordinate and incidental advantage, namely, the observation by the tribunal of the
witness' demeanor on the
stand, as a minor means of judging the
29
value of his testimony.
Various other theories advanced as reasons for excluding
hearsay are spoken of by Wigmore and shown to be merely minor
reasons, if reasons at all. These include: (1) the risk of incorrect transmission - this would apply to oral statements but the
hearsay rule excludes both written and oral statements; and (2)
intrinsic weakness - this weakness is obviously the ill that is
sought to be corrected by cross-examination.30 As noted above,
the Illinois courts accept the lack of opportunity to cross-ex31
amine as the basis for the Hearsay Rule.
Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule developed due to two considerations: (1) a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness
and (2) necessity. 2 The fact was that cross-examination was
25 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Introductory Notes ch. vi at 163 (1942).
"Experience on the bench and at the bar makes it abundantly clear that the
chief value of cross-examination is to disclose defects relating to perception

or memory; occasionally it reveals misleading qualities in narration, and

rather infrequently exposes intentional falsehood."
Id. 26 Wheaton,
What Is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REV. 221 (1960-61).
"Most
writers, both judicial and non-judicial, feel that this lack of opportunity to
cross-examine is the basic reason for rejecting hearsay." Id.
21 Id. at 220. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §224 at 457 (1954) ; 5
WIGMORE §1362.

5 WIGMORE §1365.
Id.
30 5 WIGMORE §1363.
31People v. Carpenter, 28 Ill. 2d 116, 190 N.E.2d 738 (1963).
"Probably the Wigmore theory is as good as any in accepting the process of
testing by cross-examination as the test of admissibility generally." S.
GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL Rule 146, Comment at 168-69 (1963).
32 5 WIGMORE §1420.
28
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designed to guarantee accuracy and trustworthiness but in some
instances these two guarantees could be satisfied by considerations other than cross-examination. In fact, cross-examination
proves to be superfluous. Wigmore says that, "[i]t may be
sufficiently clear, in that instance, that the statement offered is
free enough from the risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would be a work of
supererogation. '33 Consequently, in some instances there will
be an implicit trustworthiness (i.e., a declaration against interest
has a built-in trustworthiness inasmuch as one would not say
something against his pecuniary interest unless it were true).
Also, a witness or declarant may be dead, hence, creating the
necessity of receiving the uncross-examined or unchallenged
statement rather than no statement at all upon the issue.
The rationale of necessity means that certain hearsay evidence will be accepted untested by cross-examination rather than
to have no evidence admitted at all. It is based upon the principle of accepting the best possible evidence, regardless of its probative value. Dying declarations are accepted out of necessity
(death causing the necessity). Declarations against interest are
accepted out of necessity (the unavailability of the declarant being the cause of the necessity). Spontaneous declarations are
received out of necessity (the evidence may never have the same
value as when uttered spontaneously) .4
With respect to the principle of the circumstantial probability of trustworthiness, Wigmore cites three classes which
make the test of cross-examination superfluous:
a. Where the circumstances are such that a sincere and accurate statement would naturally be uttered, and no plan of falsification be formed;
b. Where, even though a desire to falsify might present itself,
other considerations, such as the danger of easy detection or the
fear of punishment, would probably counteract its force;
c. Where the statement was made under such conditions of
publicity that an error, if
it had occurred, would probably have been
35
detected and corrected.
[T]he exceptions for Declarations of Mental Condition, Spontaneous Declarations, and Declarations against Interest rest entirely on
Reason a; while the exception for Declarations about Family History (Pedigree) rests largely upon Reason a, though partly also on
Reason c. The exception for Dying Declarations rests entirely on
Reason b (the fear of divine punishment). The exception for
Regular Entries rests chiefly on Reason b, though partly also on
Reason a and c. The exception for Official Statements rests chiefly
on Reasons b and c,though a also enters. .33

Id.
84See 5

WIGMORE §1421.

35 5 WIGMORE §1422.

6 Id.
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While it is seen that exceptions have developed because of
necessity and trustworthiness, "[t] hese two principles - Necessity and Trustworthiness - are only imperfectly carried out in
the detailed rules under the exceptions.

'

37

ADMISSIONS

According to Wigmore, "anything said by the party opponent may be used against him as an admission, provided it exhibits the quality of inconsistency with the facts now asserted
by him in pleadings or in testimony." 38 The Illinois courts have
defined an admission as, "[t]he statement of a fact against the
interest of a party making it .... -39 or the [w]ords or acts of a
party opponent offered as evidence against him." 0
An admission is the statement of a party. It is, "[r] eceivable in evidence only when the declarant or someone identified
with him in legal interest is a party to the suit and the admission is offered against him.

14

1

Thus an admission is a statement

made by a party. A statement made by one not a party cannot
be an admission. But it is not merely any statement made by a
37 5 WIGMORE §1423.
In discussing the fact that the principles of
necessity and trustworthiness are not always properly applied Wigmore says:
The two principles are not applied with equal strictness in every exception; sometimes one, sometimes the other, has been chiefly in mind. In
one or two instances one of them is practically lacking. Nevertheless
they play a fundamental part. It is impossible without them to understand the exceptions. In these principles is contained whatever of reason
underlies the exceptions. What does not present itself as an application
of them is the result of mere precedent, or tradition, or arbitrariness.
Id.
38 4 WIGMORE §1048.
39 Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 306 Ill. App. 430, 439, 28 N.E.2d
743, 749 (1940) (emphasis added).
40 McNealy v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 43 Ill. App. 2d 460, 472, 193 N.E.2d
879, 886 (1963) (emphasis added). See also Woodruff v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
52 Ill. App. 2d 341, 202 N.E.2d 113 (1964) which cites Wigmore's definition
as anything a party-opponent says being used as an admission against him.
Accord, Schutt v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 79 Ill. App, 2d 69, 223 N.E.2d 264
(1967); Sidwell v. Sidwell, 75 Ill. App. 2d 133, 220 N.E.2d 479 (1966);
People v. Marshall, 74 Ill. App. 2d 472, 221 N.E.2d 128 (1966). This latter
case defines an admission as, "a statement made out of court by a party and
may take either the form of uttered words or the form of conduct from which
is inferred a belief of the party." Id. at 481, 221 N.E.2d at 133.
An interesting case is Elliotte v. Lavier, 299 Mich. 353, 300 N.W. 116
(1941) which by way of dicta defines admissions as, "statements made by or
on behalf of a party to the suit in which they are offered which contradict
some position assumed by that party in that suit." Id. at 357, 300 N.W. at
118. See also Maltby v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 347 Ill. App. 441, 106 N.E.2d
879 (1952).
41 C.
CHAMBERLAYNE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE §2770 (1913)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as CHAMBERLAYNE].
See also W.
REYNOLDS, LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1890). Reynolds defines an admission
as:
[A] statement, oral, written, or by tacit acquiescence, suggesting an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant thereto, made by or on behalf
of any party to any proceeding, and is (subject to the rules hereinafter
stated) relevant as against the person by or on whose behalf it was
made, but not in his favor unless admissible in evidence for some other
reason.
Id. at 21.
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party, it must be a statement against the party's interest. Wigmore points out this second requirement is never actually
the party's
enforced because an opponent will not 4introduce
2
statement unless it is in fact unfavorable.
It should be pointed out that an admission has other essential features complementary to being a statement against interest
made by a party, which should be mentioned though they are not
germane to the present discussion. These other features or
characteristics will help distinguish it from a declaration against
interest. They include: (1) the fact that it need not be against
pecuniary or proprietary interest; (2) that it is primary evidence and competent even if the maker is present and in court;
and; (4) admissions are
(3) that it may be made at any4 time,
3
determined largely by procedure.
It has been mentioned above that an admission is an exception to the Hearsay Rule. Before explaining this statement, it
is necessary to clarify the position that an admission, as used in
general context in this article, refers only to extra-judicial statements - it does not refer to admissions made in pleadings or
made in open court. Hence, when an extra-judicial or out-ofcourt statement made by a party is introduced by the opponent,
it must be tested by the Hearsay Rule. In other words, is such
a statement to be excluded as hearsay because it is not tested
by the Hearsay Rule test of cross-examination? The statement
is offered to prove the truth of it and not just as proof that it
was made. It then must be subject to cross-examination or it
is hearsay and is excluded. However, perhaps it is an exception
to the Hearsay Rule. Exceptions are based upon the principles4
of necessity and circumstantial probability of trustworthiness.1
It does not appear that there is necessity for admitting the statement, but it does appear that there is some guarantee of trustworthiness because one would not ordinarily admit something
which is against his interest unless it is true. It is readily apparent that there is a question as to whether or not an admission is
an exception to the Hearsay Rule. Wigmore believes that an admission satisfies the Hearsay Rule test, i.e., cross-examination,
and therefore is not an exception to the Hearsay Rule. The party
himself is the only one who could invoke the Hearsay Rule when
his own statement is used against him and he can hardly say that
he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine himself.45 This
4 WIGMORE §1048.
4 2CHAMBERLAYNE §1235; 4 CHAMBERLAYNE §2770.
44 See text at note 22 supra.
42

45 4 WIGMORE §1048.

The theory of the Hearsay rule is that an extra-judicial assertion
is excluded unless there has been sufficient opportunity to test the
grounds of assertion and the credibility of the witness, by cross-examina-
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very point is stressed by the Illinois Appellate court in Hudson v.
Augustine's, Inc.46 when it said:
[B]ut a decedent's statements against interest [admissions] are
not objectionable because of the lack of opportunity to crossexamine, because the lack of opportunity to cross-examine is deprived of significance by the incongruity of the party's objecting to
his own statement on the ground that
he was not subject to cross47
examination by himself at the time.
It is contended that admissions are admissible, not as an8
exception to the Hearsay Rule, but on the basis of estoppel.4
"The true theory would seem to be that, if relevant, it is admissible against the party making it, because, having admitted the
fact to be true, he cannot complain if it is treated as true, and
that whatever a party has voluntarily admitted to be true,
whether against his interest or not, may reasonably be taken as
49
true.
But admissions, both party and vicarious, when not within some
other exception to the Rule, come in simply because the party or
one for whom he is held responsible, has said them, without reference to probative value. This leads irresistibly to the conclusion
that an estoppel is being invoked against the party to assert the
hearsay objection. 50
Whether the admissibility of an admission is accepted under
an estoppel theory, or under a satisfaction of the Hearsay Rule
theory, or under an exception to the Hearsay Rule, it remains
that, "admissions of a party to a suit are always competent and
admissible as substantive evidence when offered by the opposite
tion by the party against whom it is offered; e.g. if Jones had said out of
court "The party-opponent Smith borrowed this fifty dollars", Smith is
entitled to an opportunity to cross-examine Jones upon that assertion.
But if it is Smith himself who said out of court, "I borrowed this fifty
dollars," certainly Smith cannot complain of lack of opportunity to crossexamine himself before his assertion is admitted against him. Such a
request would be absurd. Hence the objection of the Hearsay rule falls
away, because the very basis of the rule is lacking, viz. the need and
prudence of affording an opportunity of cross-examination.
Id.
46 Hudson v. Augustine's, Inc., 72 Ill. App. 2d 225, 218 N.E.2d 510 (1966).
47 Id. at 232, 218 N.E.2d at 513-14. See also Morgan, Admissions as an
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L. J. 355 (1920-21).
48 Other theories are advanced.
No matter on what basis admissions are received, whether as a substitute
for proof, as Wharton maintained, or that the Hearsay Rule is satisfied,
as Wigmore argued, or, as suggested by Morgan, under an exception to
the Hearsay Rule permitted by dispensing with the necessity of crossexamination, or as relevant conduct under the thesis of Strahorn, it is
easily perceived that the rules of substantive law should have no
application.
Lev, The Law of Vicarious Admissions - an Estoppel, 26 U. CIN. L. REV.
34 (1957).
49 1 ELLIOTT, EVIDENCE §220 (1904).
See 2 B. JONES, COMMENTARIES
ON EVIDENCE §§899-901 (2d ed. 1926).
50 Lev, The Law of Vicarious Admissions - an Estoppel, 26 U. CIN L.
REv. 17, 44 (1957).
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party, and that evidence of such admissions is not subject to the
51
objection that the evidence is hearsay."
Consequently, the statement of the co-defendant driver in
the Frazier case was an admission of a party. For the party to
admit that he was intoxicated is an admission against his interest. His statement could have been used against him. 52 A
question arises as to what binding effect the admission of the
co-defendant driver would have on the co-defendant tavern

owner.
ADMISSIONS BY CO-PARTIES

According to one legal commentator:
The mere fact that parties, without joint interests, are codefendants or coplaintiffs, does not render the statement of one
admissible against the other. The admission of one defendant is
not evidence against a plaintiff pursuing another defendant on
independent grounds. While such admissions are evidence against
the party himself, they cannot be used against those who have been
joined with him merely for purposes of the action, either as

plaintiff 53or defendant as the case may be, but not as joint contractors.

This statement seems to summarize the law on admissions by
co-parties. Certainly, if an admission is viewed on an estoppel
theory, it is conceivable that one party's admission should not
bind the other party unless there is a close relationship between
the parties - i.e., unless there is a joint interest. Lev has stated:
Whether one should be bound by the declarations of another,
conceding the premise that admissions of a party are received by
way of an estoppel, should be made to depend on the affirmative
acts of the party in selecting his co-venturer, a conduct of association with the declarant whose utterances are sought to be admitted, such that the identity of interest created by the behavior
5 Van Meter v. Gurney, 240 Ill. App. 165, 188 (1926). Accord, Stump
v. Dudley, 285 Ill. 46, 120 N.E. 481 (1918); Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber
Co., 306 Ill. App. 430, 28 N.E.2d 743 (1940) in which Henry Susemiehl, as
administrator of the estate of Walter Susemiehl, sued Red River Lumber
and Walter Gehrke, driver and owner of the automobile involved in the
accident. The lumber company alleged that at the time of the accident,
Gehrke was an independent contractor on a frolic of his own. The court admitted evidence of a workman's compensation claim by the lumber company to
their insurance company indicating that their employee Gehrke was injured in
an auto accident. The court found the report to be an admission of an officer.
See also McDonald v. Risch, 90 Ill. App. 2d 445, 232 N.E.2d 569 (1967)
rev'd on other grounds, 41 Ill. 2d 242, 242 N.E.2d 245 (1969) ; Woodruff v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 52 Ill. App. 2d 341, 202 N.E.2d 113 (1964) ; Stewart v.
DuPlessis, 42 Ill. App. 2d 192, 191 N.E.2d 622 (1963) ; Jacks v. Woodruff, 9
Ill. App. 2d 224, 132 N.E.2d 603 (1956) ; Casey v. Burns, 7 Ill. App. 2d 316,
129 N.E.2d 440 (1955); Barrows v. Midwest Transfer Co., 4 111. App. 2d
191, 124 N.E.2d 20 (1955). See, e.g., Asher v. Stromberg, 78 Ill. App. 2d
267, 223 N.E.2d 300 (1966); Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 302 Ill. 401, 134 N.E. 754 (1922).
52 Co-defendant driver could not be located for trial.
532 B. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE §938 (2d ed. 1926).
See
Holcomb v. Magee, 217 Ill. App. 272 (1920); Rogers v. Suttle & Scroggin,
19 Ill. App. 163 (1885).
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of the party would estop him54 from denying that the declarations
should be treated as his own.

55
This may be illustrated by an 1884 case, MeMillan v. McDill,
which serves as a classic illustration of the effect of an admission

where the interest among the co-parties is either joint or several.
In that case, the deceased had bequeathed all of his personal

and real property to seven persons.

The executor, who was a

party to the suit, had made a statement to the effect that the
testator did not have the mental capacity to make the will. The
court refused to allow the admission by the executor into evidence. The court said:
It is plain that the admission of one who is the sole party interested in the issue before the jury, would always be competent
evidence, when called out, against such party; but where several
parties are interested, as here, can the declarations of one be admitted as evidence against that one, when such admission will di56
rectly affect the issue as against the other parties ?
The court's answer was no. Its reasoning was summed up as
follows:
If the interest of the devisees had been joint, the evidence might
have been admitted against all of them, as we understand it to be
a rule of evidence where the parties have a joint interest in the
matter in suit, an admission made by one is in general competent
57
evidence against all.

The court then went on to conclude that the interest of each of
the seven was several or separate, not joint, and therefore the admission of one co-party defendant was not admissible against the
other defendants. Similarly in Worthy v. Birk,5 8 the appellate
court refused to admit an admission of a co-defendant as against
another co-defendant stating that it would only be proper to do
so if the two defendants were co-conspirators or one had authorized the other to make such an admission. Another excellent
example wherein admissions of one defendant were not allowed
to be used against a co-defendant, because the interests of the two
were not joint, is the Arizona case of Bristol v. Moser.59 The
54 Lev, The Law of Vicarious Admissions - an Estoppel, 26 U. CIN. L.
Ruv. 17, 34 (1957). "A voluntary alliance may draw with it responsibility;
it should not be where the association is authored by circumstances." Id.
at 37.
The present writer is of the belief that the party is being estopped to
assert the hearsay objection as a judicial penalty for inconsistency. If
the statement made out of court is uttered by an express agent, or one
with whom the party is joined in interest, the estoppel rests on the
affirmative conduct of the party in choosing to act in concert with the
declarant and in impliedly accepting responsibility for the remarks of
his associate.
Id. at 49.
55110 Ill. 47 (1884).
56 Id. at 50.
57 Id. at 51.
68 224 Ill. App. 574 (1922).
59 Bristol v. Moser, 55 Ariz. 185, 190-91; 99 P.2d 706, 709 (1940) provides a good example. The facts were as follows:
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court said: "It is true that the admission of one defendant may
be offered in evidence as against a co-defendant whose interest in
the transaction is the same, but when the interest or liability of
the co-parties is several, the admissions of one are not competent
' 60
against the others.
The logic of this rule is explained in Belfield v. Coop 6l where
it is stated:
This court has consistently followed the rule that statements
or admissions made by a devisee or legatee concerning the testamentary capacity of a testator, or acts of undue influence in procuring the execution of a will, while admissible where the interests
of all the devisees or legatees are joint, are not admissible where
their interests are separate and no conspiracy is charged. This rule
is adhered to in other jurisdictions and represents the great weight
of authority elsewhere. The reason for the rule is that the declarant is not the only one interested in the issue to be tried and
that it would be unjust to allow the interests of one beneficiary to
be affected by admissions or declarations against interest of another with whom he is not in privity ....62
In summary, it appears that the admission of one co-party
may not be used against another co-party unless there is privity,
joint interest, consent, or a relationship so close as to imply a
consent or agency. The interest or closeness must be real not
feigned. With respect to Frazier, there does not appear to be
any privity, joint interest, consent, or other close relationship
between the co-party driver and the co-party tavern owner.
There is no interest that would justify one speaking for the other.
In fact, they are adversaries. Consequently, the admission of the
co-party driver should not be admissible against the co-party
We come then to the admission of Mrs. Bristol, and for the purpose
of the case we must assume she did make the statements above set forth.
Upon examining the complaint, it will be seen therefrom that there is
no allegation that Alma Bristol had any part in the employment of
plaintiff. The allegation is that she and L. J. Bristol were wife and
husband, and that L. J. Bristol was his employer. This is not an allegation of a joint obligation of two parties to a third, and under these allegations no judgment could be rendered as against the wife which would
bind her separate property. She was not even a necessary party to the
suit for it was one to enforce an obligation contracted by the husband in
the interest of the community and enforcible against the community
assets.

60 Id. at 191, 99 P. 2d at 709.
61 Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956).
62
Id. at 300; 134 N.E.2d at 253. See also 1 ELLIOTT, EVIDENCE §248

(1904) which indicates that the admission of one co-party is not admissible
against the other co-party unless there is joint interest or privity. Accord,
Lowe v. Huckins, 356 Ill. 360, 190 N.E. 683 (1934) ; Republic Iron & Steel
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 302 Ill. 401, 134 N.E. 754 (1922); Phillips v.
Gannon, 246 Ill.98, 92 N.E. 616 (1910); McMillan v. McDill, 110 Ill. 47
(1884) ; Snydacker v. Brosse, 51 Ill. 357, 99 Am. D. 551 (1869) ; Van Meter
v. Gurney, 240 Ill.App. 165 (1926); Worthy v. Birk, 224 Ill. App. 574
(1920) ; Hill v. Hiles, 309 Ill.
App. 321, 32 N.E.2d 933 (1941). It also appears
that Pellico v. Jackson, 70 Ill. App. 2d 313, 217 N.E.2d 281 (1966) supports
the proposition that the admission of one co-party is not binding upon another
co-party where their relation is several, not joint.

380

The John Marshall Journalof Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 3:364

tavern owner. A question remains now as to whether the statement involved in Frazier could qualify as a declaration against
interest.
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

Chamberlayne indicates that a declaration against interest
is a statement made by a third person (not a party) which is
against the maker's pecuniary or proprietary interest. It is said
to be secondary evidence, incompetent unless the declarant is
dead or unavailable for sufficient reason and it may not be made
post litem motam (after the suit has commenced) .63 It appears
that almost all writers agree that a declaration against interest
is a statement that meets the following four, often-stated, tests:
(1) the declarant must be dead or unavailable, (2) the declaration, when made, must be against the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interests, (3) the declarant must have competent
knowledge of the facts, and (4) the declarant must have no
4
probable motive to falsify6
The declaration against interest is treated as an exception
to the Hearsay rule. Thus, it is admissible, even though not
subject to cross-examination, because of (1) necessity and (2)
the circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. 5 Wigmore
explains why the declaration against interest has the special test
of trustworthiness, releasing it from the necessity of a crossexamination to verify such trustworthiness, when he says, "[a]
statement of a fact against interest is receivable on the ground
that such a statement is one which would presumably not be made
unless truth compelled it, and that it is therefore as trustworthy
as if made on the stand under cross-examination."' 6B
The declaration against interest exception seems very clear,
but it presents a difficult gray area of application where the writers and courts have not been explicit. The question arises whether
an admission of a party can become admissible as a declaration
against interest. This problem came to light in the Fraziercase.
Since the admission of the co-party defendant driver was not admissible against the defendant tavern owner as an admission
because there was no joint interest between the two, it became
2 CHAMBERLAYNE §1235.
See Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1944); Morgan, Declarations Against
63

64

Interest, 5 VAND. L. REV. 451 (1951-52); See also Haskell v. Siegmund, 28

Ill. App. 2d 1, 170 N.E.2d 393 (1960) ; German Ins. Co. v. Bartlett, 188 Ill.
165, 173, 58 N.E. 1075, 1077 (1900) ; 31A C.J.S. Evidence §217 (1964) ; E.
CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINoIs EVIDENCE §17.22 (2d ed. 1963). See also
an excellent case from Minnesota involving a Dram Shop statute but slightly
different facts from the principal case: Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402,

18 N.W.2d 142 (1945).
65
66

5 WIGMORE §1455.
5 WIGMORE §1457.
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clear that it could only be admitted if it was found to be a declaration against interest. Thus the question became whether an admission not admissible against a co-party because of lack of joint
interest could become admissible as a declaration against interest
if the co-party making the declaration became unavailable.
It would appear unnecessary to resort to the declaration
against interest tests when a statement against interest is sought
to be used against a party. It is manifestly easier to get the
statement in as an admission. However, when a statement
against interest is sought to be used against a co-party it may not
be possible to get it in as an admission. If the interest between
the co-parties is not joint, representative, or consensual, the admission of one cannot be used or introduced as the admission of
the other. This is where the problem arises. No court has ruled
upon the question of whether a party's admission can be turned
into a declaration against interest - i.e. whether a declaration
against interest can be made by a party. In Frazier, defendantappellees, co-party tavern owners, contended that declarations
against interest pertained merely to non-party witnesses because
of the consideration of reliability. Certainly a party to a lawsuit
is, by definition, interested in its outcome.67 As previously observed, Chamberlayne stated that a declaration against interest
is made by a third person, not by a party. Mr. Kaye, in an article
on admissions and declarations against interest, indicates that a
declaration against interest, "is an out of court statement by a
'non-party' [a stranger to the suit] which ordinarily is inadmissible if the 'non-party' who made it is available to testify."' ,
Contrary to this view that a declaration against interest
cannot be made by a party, but must be made by a non-party declarant, there are cases69 which are often cited as classic cases
on declarations against interest that seem to indicate that a party
may make a declaration against interest. In Elliotte v. Lavier"
67 See Petition for Rehearing, Frazier v. Burks, 95 Ill. App. 2d 51, 238
N.E.6 2d 78 (1968).
8 Department of Popular Misapprehensions Revisited, TRIAL BRIEFS
1065 (July-Aug. 1968).
The appellate court in Frazier quoted from American Jurisprudence
regarding declarations against interest:

An important exception to the hearsay rule renders admissible in

evidence relevant declarations against interest by one not a party nor
in privity with a party to the action, where the declarant has since died
or is not available as a witness, even though there is no opportunity to
confront the declarant or to cross-examine him. (emphasis added.)
Frazier at 54; 238 N.E.2d at 80. The seeming implication is that one must
be a non-party to make a declaration against interest. However, these seem-

ing implications exist in many decisions and many articles and never are
clearly explained. See other definitions in Frazier. See also Morgan,
Declarations
Against Interest, 5 VAND. L. REv. 451 (1951-52).
69
See Elliotte v. Lavier, 299 Mich. 353, 300 N.W. 116 (1941); Roe v.
Journegan, 175 N.C. 261, 95 S.E. 495 (1918).
70

Elliotte v. Lavier, 299 Mich. 353; 300 N.W. 116 (1941).
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the court stated, "[d] eclarations against interest are statements
which, when made, conflicted with the pecuniary interest of the
person making them, who need not have been party, privy or
witness to the suit in which they are offered.' ' 71 The phrase,
"who need not have been party" would seem to indicate that there
are cases where a party may make a declaration against interest,
or that an admission of a party may be admitted in evidence
as a declaration against interest if it meets the four point test of
are found scatthe declaration against interest. Phrases like this
72
tered throughout various cases and comments.
Before analyzing whether a party can make a declaration
against interest it is necessary to restate some conclusions made
above. An admission is not the same as a declaration against
interest. An admission can only be a statement of a party. An
admission is, in effect, an exception to the Hearsay Rule. It
permits the use of a statement without the opportunity for crossexamination. The admission may be admitted into evidence for
one of several reasons: (1) as an exception to the Hearsay Rule,
(2) because it satisfies the Hearsay Rule, or (3) on an estoppel
theory. In any case, when a party makes a statement against
his interest it is admitted on the basis that it is an admission.
This indicates an admission is the only way to introduce a statement against interest by a party. This conclusion is justified
inasmuch as there is no need for a party's statement against interest to meet the four tests of a declaration against interest if
it is to be introduced against the party himself. There is no need
to go to the trouble of showing the declarant was unavailable,
when in fact, this usually is not the case. There is no reason to
show a pecuniary or proprietary interest when this is not necessary. The same appears true when a co-party seeks to use a
statement against interest against his fellow co-party. If their
interest is joint, an admission of one can be used against the
other. Again, there is no need to try to qualify the statement
as a declaration against interest when it is easily admitted as
an admission. Logic compels the conclusion that a declaration
against interest must always be made by a non-party, and a
party's statements against interest will always be an admission.
It was suggested above that the introduction of a statement
against interest by a party as a declaration against interest is
necessary only when co-parties are involved and the interest of
the co-parties is not joint (in which case the admission of the
Id. at 357; 300 N.W. at 118
See note 64 supra. See
31 Il1. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d
against interest though the court
inthe case.
71
72

(emphasis added).
also Levy v. American Auto. Ins. Co.,
607 (1961) which discusses declarations
did not find a declaration against interest
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one co-party may not be used against the other.) However, it
,appears that even under these circumstances the statement of
the co-party can never meet the qualifications of a declaration
against interest when the tests are analyzed and applied.
With respect to test one, the declarant must be dead or unavailable. There is a strong movement today to eliminate this requirement." It is obvious that the unavailability does not go to
the guarantee of trustworthiness. It is no more accurate or
truthful because the declarant is dead or not available. The point
was emphasized by the defendant-appellees tavern owners in the
Frazier case when they argued in requesting a rehearing in the
appellate court: "The upshot of the Court's opinion is that
though an admission by party A is inadmissible against co-party
B when both A and B are present in Court, an admission by party
A arises to the level of admissibility against B when A is absent." 74 This requirement of unavailability satisfies the necessity requirement for an exception to the Hearsay Rule. Hence,
it becomes immediately clear that a party's admission which is
not admissible against a co-party does not or could not become
any more admissible because the declarant (party) has become
unavailable. Unavailability merely goes to the necessity of accepting a witness' out-of-court statement and it is not a prerequisite to receiving an admission.
With respect to test two, the declaration must be against
pecuniary or proprietary interest. The statement must be analyzed closely to determine whether or not it is actually against
interest. Appropo is a statement made by Morgan:
At times a statement may have a double aspect: the fact
stated may be against interest to a given degree and for interest
otherwise. Thus if T, a taxpayer, in making his return, states his
income to be in the highest figure which calls for no surtax, say
$4,000, he must realize the fact stated is against his interest to the
extent that it subjects him to a tax upon at least $4,000. If there
is a question whether his income is more than $4,000, he must
realize that the fact stated is for his interest in that it relieves
him from a larger normal tax and from all surtaxes. If in an
action between third parties the question is whether T's income
was at least $4,000, evidence of T's tax return to the extent that
it was against interest is relevant and admissible; if the question
is whether T's income was more than $4,000, his tax return has no
relevant statement against his interest and seems to have no guar75
anty of trustworthiness.
This double aspect of a declaration against interest is evi7 See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Comment, rule 509 at 187 (1942);
Declarations Against Interest - Rules of Admissibility, 62 Nw. U.L. REV.
934 (1968).
74 Petition for Rehearing at 5, Frazier v. Burks, 95 Ill. App. 2d 51, 238
N.E.2d 78 (1968).
75 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Comment, rule 509 at 187-88.
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denced in the Frazier case when the co-party defendant driver
stated that he became intoxicated in the co-party defendant

tavern owner's tavern. In one respect, it is against the driver's
interest to state he was intoxicated, and hence it becomes trustworthy with regard to his liability in that respect. However,
when this declaration is viewed from the point that the declarant became intoxicated in the defendant co-party's tavern, it is
no longer trustworthy because it is against another's interest.
When examined from this posture, the declaration is not against

the interest of the co-party defendant driver.

This conclusion

would always follow when there is no joint interest between coparties. That is, lacking a joint interest it would appear that
when a party's statement against interest (an admission) is
sought to be introduced against the co-party as a declaration
against interest it will lack the necessary quality of being against
interest. It will become self-serving in the sense that it will not
be against the declarant's interest and quite possibly will help the
declarant show fault on the part of his co-party.
CONCLUSION

The statement of the co-party defendant driver in the
Fraziercase would not appear to have been a declaration against
interest and it should not have been permitted to be introduced as
such. The statement was an admission. Since it was an admission by a co-party, and since there was no joint interest between
the co-parties, it was not admissible against the co-party defen76
dant tavern owner.
In Frazier the appellate court set a dangerous precedent
when it allowed an admission of a co-party which ordinarily
76 Dramshop cases involve some very special dangers because of the practical realities involved. The courts must be particularly careful in dramshop cases when analyzing a statement to determine whether or not it meets
the requirement of being against pecuniary or proprietary interest. The
writer has worked as an investigator and also as an adjustor and claim
supervisor for an insurance company and is familiar with the practical
realities involved in some types of dramshop cases. An example of what can
happen is presented by the following hypothetical situation.
Tortfeasor A is the driver and owner of an automobile which rear ends
the automobile driven by plaintiff C. A may or may not have purchased
liquor from tortfeasor B (the dramshop owner).
This question will be resolved by the trier of the facts based upon the evidence presented. A has
no insurance and seemingly no assets. B carries insurance. C has an excellent liability case against A but a questionable case against B. C hires
an investigator with instructions to obtain a statement signed by A involving
B in the matter. C will tell the investigator, D, how to proceed or hire an
experienced investigator who will know how to proceed. D will approach A.
The danger arises at this point. A will at first refuse to sign a statement admitting his drinking. D will inform A that C knows A is uninsured
and does not want to hurt A, if A will only cooperate and sign a statement
involving B. D will tell A that he can avoid much unpleasantness by signing
a statement. D may also inform A that he won't have to show up for the
trial or that he'll eventually be dismissed out of the case, if he cooperates
now. D may have to threaten A with all the unpleasantness of a lengthy
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would not have been admissible against a co-party because of lack
of joint interest to be admitted into evidence as a declaration
against interest."7 It would appear that this was not the intent
of the court but merely a misapplication or mixing of the fine
distinctions between admissions and declarations against interest
which are entirely separate concepts and must be carefully distinguished.
Jay S. Judge

trial, judgment, execution, attachment, garnishment and such. Often A will
take the easy way out and sign a statement involving B.
In this situation, A's statement could be an admission. Certainly, the
part admitting his drinking would be such. If it is an admission, it is clear
that it couldn't be used against the co-party because the interests of A and B
are contrary, not joint. If it is considered a declaration against interest,
and the previous above discussion shows that it is not, it still must pass the
tests: (1) is A truly unavailable? (2) is it against pecuniary or proprietary
interest? (3) does A have competent knowledge? and (4)does A have motive to falsify?
7
As was mentioned earlier in this article the concept of admi3sions and
declarations against interest is often confused. Quite often this results
The Illinois
when the term, "admissions against interest" is used.
case of Clements v. Schless Constr. Co., 91 Ill. App. 2d 19, 234 N.E.2d 578
(1968) illustrates this point. The court said, "L] ikewise, we believe that
the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to introduce in evidence part of
plaintiff's depositions as admissions against interest. At all times the
plaintiff, who had suffered a brain injury was present and available to
testify. Id. at 25; 234 N.E.2d at 581. This is the classic example of mixing
an admission with a declaration against interest. Since the plaintiff was a
party any statement against interest may be admitted into evidence as an
admission. The fact of availability or unavailability does not matter. The
court was obviously looking to test one of the four point tests for declarations
against interest and using that to test an admission. This was error.

